|Citation||Alexander J. T. Gurney, Andreas Haeberlen, Wenchao Zhou, Micah Sherr and Boon Thau Loo. 2011. Having your cake and eating it too: Routing security with privacy protections. Tenth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networking (HotNets-X), Boston.|
Internet Service Providers typically do not reveal details of their interdomain routing policies due to security
concerns, or for commercial or legal reasons. As a result, it is difﬁcult to hold ISPs accountable for their contractual
agreements. Existing solutions can check basic properties, e.g., whether route announcements correspond to valid routes,
but they do not verify how these routes were chosen. In essence, today’s Internet forces us to choose between per-AS
privacy and veriﬁability.
In this paper, we argue that making this difﬁcult tradeoff is unnecessary. We propose private and veriﬁable routing (PVR), a technique that enables ISPs to check whether their neighbors are fulﬁlling their contractual promises to them, and to obtain evidence of any violations, without disclosing information that the routing protocol does not already reveal. As initial evidence that PVR is feasible, we sketch a PVR system that can verify some simple BGP policies. We conclude by highlighting several research challenges as future work.