

# ESE534: Computer Organization

Day 12: March 3, 2010  
Defect and Fault Tolerance



## Today

- Defect and Fault Tolerance
  - Problem
  - Defect Tolerance
  - Fault Tolerance

## Warmup Discussion

- Where do we guard against defects and faults today?
  - [Where do we accept imperfection today?]

## Motivation: Probabilities

- Given:
  - N objects
  - $P_g$  yield probability
- What's the probability for yield of composite system of N items? [Preclass 1]
  - Assume iid faults
  - $P(\text{N items good}) = (P_g)^N$

## Probabilities

- $P_{\text{all\_good}}(N) = (P_g)^N$
- $P = 0.999999$

N	$P_{\text{all\_good}}(N)$
$10^4$	
$10^5$	
$10^6$	
$10^7$	

## Probabilities

- $P_{\text{all\_good}}(N) = (P_g)^N$
- $P = 0.999999$

N	$P_{\text{all\_good}}(N)$
$10^4$	0.99
$10^5$	0.90
$10^6$	0.37
$10^7$	0.000045


## Simple Implications

- As N gets large
    - must either increase reliability
    - ...or start tolerating failures
  - N
    - memory bits
    - disk sectors
    - wires
    - transmitted data bits
    - processors
    - transistors
    - molecules
- As devices get **smaller**, failure rates increase
- chemists think P=0.95 is good
- As devices get **faster**, failure rate increases

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## Failure Rate Increases



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[Nassif / DATE 2010]

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## Quality Required for Perfection?

- How high must  $P_g$  be to achieve 90% yield on a collection of  $10^{10}$  devices?

[preclass 3]

$$(P_g)^{10^{10}} > 0.9$$

$$P_g > 1 - 10^{-11}$$

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## Defining Problems

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## Three Problems

- 1. Defects:** Manufacturing imperfection
  - Occur before operation; persistent
    - Shorts, breaks, bad contact
- 2. Transient Faults:**
  - Occur during operation; transient
    - node X value flips: crosstalk, ionizing particles, bad timing, tunneling, thermal noise
- 3. Lifetime “wear” defects**
  - Parts become bad during operational lifetime
    - Fatigue, electromigration, burnout....
  - ...slower
    - NBTI, Hot Carrier Injection

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## Defects

- Shorts example of defect
- Persistent problem
  - reliably manifests
- Occurs before computation
- Can test for at fabrication / boot time and then avoid
- (1<sup>st</sup> half of lecture)

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## Faults

- Alpha particle bit flips is an example of a fault
- Fault occurs dynamically during execution
- At any point in time, can fail
  - (produce the wrong result)
- (2<sup>nd</sup> half of lecture)

## Lifetime Wear

- Starts out fine
- Over time changes
  - *E.g.* resistance increases until out of spec.
- Persistent
  - So can use defect techniques to avoid
- But, onset is dynamic
  - Must use fault detection techniques to recognize?

## In a Nut-shell...

Sherkhar Bokar  
Intel Fellow  
Micro37 (Dec.2004)



- 100 BT integration capacity
- 20 BT unusable (variations)
- 10 BT will fail over time
- Intermittent failures

Yet, deliver high performance in the power & cost envelope

## Defect Rate

- Device with  $10^{11}$  elements (100BT)
- 3 year lifetime =  $10^8$  seconds
- Accumulating up to 10% defects
- $10^{10}$  defects in  $10^8$  seconds
  - 1 new defect every 10ms
- At 10GHz operation:
  - One new defect every  $10^8$  cycles
  - $P_{\text{newdefect}} = 10^{-19}$

## First Step to Recover

Admit you have a problem  
(observe that there is a failure)

## Detection

- How do we determine if something wrong?
  - Some things easy
    - ...won't start
  - Others tricky
    - ...one **and** gate computes False & True → True
- Observability
  - can see effect of problem
  - some way of telling if defect/fault present

## Detection

- Coding
  - space of legal values  $\ll$  space of all values
  - should only see legal
  - e.g. parity, ECC (Error Correcting Codes)
- Explicit test (defects, recurring faults)
  - ATPG = Automatic Test Pattern Generation
  - Signature/BIST=Built-In Self-Test
  - POST = Power On Self-Test
- Direct/special access
  - test ports, scan paths

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## Coping with defects/faults?

- **Key idea:** redundancy
- Detection:
  - Use redundancy to detect error
- Mitigating: use redundant hardware
  - Use spare elements in place of faulty elements (defects)
  - Compute multiple times so can discard faulty result (faults)
  - **Exploit Law-of-Large Numbers**

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## Defect Tolerance

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## Two Models

- Disk Drives (defect map)
- Memory Chips (perfect chip)

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## Disk Drives

- Expose defects to software
  - software model expects faults
    - Create table of good (bad) sectors
  - manages by masking out in software
    - (at the OS level)
    - Never allocate a bad sector to a task or file
  - yielded capacity varies

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## Memory Chips

- Provide model in **hardware** of perfect chip
- Model of perfect memory at capacity X
- Use redundancy in hardware to provide perfect model
- Yielded capacity fixed
  - discard part if not achieve

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## Example: Memory

- Correct memory:
  - N slots
  - each slot reliably stores last value written
- Millions, billions, etc. of bits...
  - have to get them all right?

## Memory Defect Tolerance

- Idea:
  - few bits may fail
  - provide more raw bits
  - configure so yield what looks like a perfect memory of specified size


## Memory Techniques

- Row Redundancy
- Column Redundancy
- Bank Redundancy

## Row Redundancy

- Provide extra rows
- Mask faults by avoiding bad rows
- Trick:
  - have address decoder substitute spare rows in for faulty rows
  - use fuses to program

## Spare Row




## Column Redundancy

- Provide extra columns
- Program decoder/mux to use subset of columns

## Spare Memory Column

- Provide extra columns
- Program output mux to avoid



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
## Bank Redundancy

- Substitute out entire bank
  - e.g. memory subarray
    - include 5 banks
    - only need 4 to yield perfect
    - (N+1 sparing more typical for larger N)

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## Spare Bank



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## Yield M of N

- Preclass 4: Probability of yielding 3 of 5 things?
  - Symbolic?
  - Numerical for  $P_g=0.9$ ?

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## Yield M of N

- $P(M \text{ of } N) = P(\text{yield } N)$ 
    - +  $(N \text{ choose } N-1) P(\text{exactly } N-1)$
    - +  $(N \text{ choose } N-2) P(\text{exactly } N-2) \dots$
    - +  $(N \text{ choose } N-M) P(\text{exactly } N-M) \dots$
- [think binomial coefficients]

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## M of 5 example

- $1 \cdot P^5 + 5 \cdot P^4(1-P)^1 + 10P^3(1-P)^2 + 10P^2(1-P)^3 + 5P^1(1-P)^4 + 1 \cdot (1-P)^5$
  - Consider  $P=0.9$ 
    - $1 \cdot P^5$  0.59
    - $5 \cdot P^4(1-P)^1$  0.33
    - $10P^3(1-P)^2$  0.07
    - $10P^2(1-P)^3$  0.008
    - $5P^1(1-P)^4$  0.00045
    - $1 \cdot (1-P)^5$  0.00001
- M=5  $P(\text{sys})=0.59$   
M=4  $P(\text{sys})=0.92$   
M=3  $P(\text{sys})=0.99$
- Can achieve higher system yield than individual components!

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## Repairable Area

- Not all area in a RAM is repairable
  - memory bits spare-able
  - io, power, ground, control not redundant

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## Repairable Area


- $P(\text{yield}) = P(\text{non-repair}) * P(\text{repair})$
- $P(\text{non-repair}) = P^{N_{nr}}$ 
  - $N_{nr} \ll N_{\text{total}}$
  - $P > P_{\text{repair}}$ 
    - e.g. use coarser feature size
- $P(\text{repair}) \sim P(\text{yield } M \text{ of } N)$

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## Consider a Crossbar

- Allows us to connect any of N things to each other
  - E.g.
    - N processors
    - N memories
    - N/2 processors
    - + N/2 memories




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## Crossbar Buses and Defects


- Two crossbars
- Wires may fail
- Switches may fail
- Provide more wires
  - Any wire fault avoidable
    - M choose N



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## Crossbar Buses and Defects

- Two crossbars
- Wires may fail
- Switches may fail
- Provide more wires
  - Any wire fault avoidable
    - M choose N




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## Crossbar Buses and Faults

- Two crossbars
- Wires may fail
- Switches may fail
- Provide more wires
  - Any wire fault avoidable
    - M choose N




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## Crossbar Buses and Faults

- Two crossbars
- Wires may fail
- Switches may fail
- Provide more wires
  - Any wire fault avoidable
    - M choose N
  - Same idea




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## Simple System

- P Processors
- M Memories
- Wires




Memory, Compute, Interconnect

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## Simple System w/ Spares

- P Processors
- M Memories
- Wires
- Provide spare
  - Processors
  - Memories
  - Wires




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## Simple System w/ Defects

- P Processors
- M Memories
- Wires
- Provide spare
  - Processors
  - Memories
  - Wires
- ...and defects




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## Simple System Repaired

- P Processors
- M Memories
- Wires
- Provide spare
  - Processors
  - Memories
  - Wires
- Use crossbar to switch together good processor and memories




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## In Practice

- Crossbars are inefficient [Day14-20]
- Use switching networks with
  - Locality
  - Segmentation
- ...but basic idea for sparing is the same



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## Defect Tolerance Questions?

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## Fault Tolerance

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## Faults

- Bits, processors, wires
  - May fail during operation
- Basic Idea same:
  - Detect failure using redundancy
  - Correct
- Now
  - Must identify and correct **online** with the computation

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
## Transient Sources

- Effects
  - Thermal noise
  - Timing
  - Ionizing particles
    - $\alpha$  particle  $10^5$  to  $10^6$  electrons
    - Calculated gates with 15--30 electrons Day 7
      - Even if CMOS restores, takes time

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
## Voltage and Error Rate



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
## Errors versus Frequency




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[Bowman, ISSCC 2008]




- ### Simple Memory Example
- **Problem:** bits may lose/change value
    - Alpha particle
    - Molecule spontaneously switches
  - **Idea:**
    - Store multiple copies
    - Perform majority vote on result
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
- ### Redundant Memory
- Like M-choose-N
  - Only fail if  $>(N-1)/2$  faults
  - $P=0.9$
  - $P(2 \text{ of } 3)$ 
    - All good:  $(0.9)^3 = 0.729$
    - + Any 2 good:  $3(0.9)^2(0.1)=0.243$
    - = **0.971**
- 
- Addr
- Dout
- Majority
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- ### Better: Less Overhead
- Don't have to keep N copies
  - Block data into groups
  - Add a small number of bits to detect/correct errors
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## Row/Column Parity


- Think of NxN bit block as array
- Compute row and column parities
  - (total of 2N bits)
- Any single bit error



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## Row/Column Parity

- Think of NxN bit block as array
- Compute row and column parities
  - (total of 2N bits)
- Any single bit error
- By recomputing parity
  - Know which one it is
  - Can correct it



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## InClass Exercise


- Which Block has an error?
- What correction do we need?

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## Row/Column Parity

- Simple case is 50% overhead
  - Add 8 bits to 16
  - Better than 200% with 3 copies
  - More expensive than used in practice



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## In Use Today

- Conventional DRAM Memory systems
  - Use 72b ECC (Error Correcting Code)
  - On 64b words [12.5% overhead]
  - Correct any single bit error
  - Detect multibit errors
- CD blocks are ECC coded
  - Correct errors in storage/reading

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## RAID

- Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks
- Disk drives have ECC on sectors
  - At least enough to detect failure
- RAID-5 has one parity disk
  - Tolerate any single disk failure
  - E.g. 8-of-9 survivability case
  - With *hot spare*, can rebuild data on spare

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## Interconnect

- Also uses checksums/ECC
  - Guard against data transmission errors
  - Environmental noise, crosstalk, trouble sampling data at high rates...
- Often just detect error
- Recover by requesting retransmission
  - E.g. TCP/IP (Internet Protocols)

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## Interconnect


- Also guards against whole path failure
- Sender expects acknowledgement
- If no acknowledgement will retransmit
- If have multiple paths
  - ...and select well among them
  - Can route around any fault in interconnect

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## Interconnect Fault Example


- Send message
- Expect Acknowledgement



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## Interconnect Fault Example


- Send message
- Expect Acknowledgement
- If Fail



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## Interconnect Fault Example


- Send message
- Expect Acknowledgement
- If Fail
  - No ack



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## Interconnect Fault Example

- If Fail → no ack
  - Retry
  - Preferably with different resource




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## Interconnect Fault Example


- If Fail → no ack
  - Retry
  - Preferably with different resource



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## Compute Elements

- Simplest thing we can do:
  - Compute redundantly
  - Vote on answer
  - Similar to redundant memory



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## Compute Elements

- Unlike Memory
  - State of computation important
  - Once a processor makes an error
    - All subsequent results may be wrong
- Response
  - “reset” processors which fail vote
  - Go to spare set to replace failing processor

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## In Use

- NASA Space Shuttle
  - Uses set of 4 voting processors
- Boeing 777
  - Uses voting processors
    - Uses different architectures for processors
    - Uses different software
    - Avoid Common-Mode failures
      - Design errors in hardware, software

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
## Forward Recovery

- Can take this voting idea to gate level
  - VonNeuman 1956
- Basic gate is a majority gate
  - Example 3-input voter
- Alternate stages
  - Compute
  - Voting (restoration)
- Number of technical details...
- High level bit:
  - Requires  $P_{gate} > 0.996$
  - Can make whole system as reliable as individual gate

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## Majority Multiplexing



Maybe there's a better way...

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[Roy+Beiu/IEEE Nano2004]

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
## Rollback Recovery

- Commit state of computation at key points
  - to memory (ECC, RAID protected...)
  - ...reduce to previously solved problem of protecting memory
- On faults (lifetime defects)
  - recover state from last checkpoint
  - like going to last backup....
  - ...(snapshot)

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## Rollback vs. Forward



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## Defect vs. Fault Tolerance

- Defect
  - Can tolerate large defect rates (10%)
    - Use virtually all good components
    - Small overhead beyond faulty components
- Fault
  - Require lower fault rate (e.g. VN < 0.4%)
    - Overhead to do so can be quite large

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## Summary

- Possible to engineer practical, reliable systems from
  - Imperfect fabrication processes (defects)
  - Unreliable elements (faults)
- We do it today for large scale systems
  - Memories (DRAMs, Hard Disks, CDs)
  - Internet
- ...and critical systems
  - Space ships, Airplanes
- Engineering Questions
  - Where invest area/effort?
    - Higher yielding components? Tolerating faulty components?
  - Where do we invoke law of large numbers?
    - Above/below the device level

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## Admin

- HW5 due Friday
- Reading for Monday 3/15 on web

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## Big Ideas

- Left to itself:
  - reliability of system << reliability of parts
- Can design
  - system reliability >> reliability of parts [defects]
  - system reliability ~ = reliability of parts [faults]
- For large systems
  - must engineer reliability of system
  - ...all systems becoming "large"

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## Big Ideas

- Detect failures
  - static: directed test
  - dynamic: use **redundancy** to guard
- Repair with **Redundancy**
- Model
  - establish and provide model of correctness
    - Perfect component model (memory model)
    - Defect map model (disk drive model)