

# Subjective Theory of Probability

## Dutch Book (de Finetti's) Theorem

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# Introduction

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- de Finetti theorem provides an alternative view that does not depend on a preliminary concept of independence, and which concentrates attention on the *linearity properties* of expectations.

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- By fair I mean that you should be prepared to accept a payment  $p(X)$  from me now in return for giving me an amount  $X$  later.
- Your return:  $X'(\omega) = X(\omega) - p(X)$ . We call this *fair return*.

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These two conditions imply that the collection of all fair returns is a vector space over field  $\mathbb{R}$ .

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- There is no fair return  $X'$  for which  $X'(\omega) < 0$  for all  $\omega \in \Omega$ , with strict inequality for at least one  $\omega$ .

# Properties of fair bets!

## Lemma

*The previous properties imply that  $p(\cdot)$  is a linear, increasing functional on random variables.*

## Proof.

For constants  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  and random variables  $X$  and  $Y$  with fair prices  $p(X)$  and  $p(Y)$ , consider the combined effect of the following fair bets:

- You pay me  $\alpha p(X)$  to receive  $\alpha X$ .
- You pay me  $\beta p(Y)$  to receive  $\beta Y$ .
- I pay you  $p(\alpha X + \beta Y)$  to receive  $\alpha X + \beta Y$ .

Your net return is  $c = p(\alpha X + \beta Y) - \alpha p(X) - \beta p(Y)$ .

If  $c > 0$ , (iii) is violated. If  $c < 0$ , consider the other side bet to violate (iii). This proves linearity.



## Proof.

To prove that  $p(\cdot)$  is increasing, suppose  $\forall \omega \in \Omega : X(\omega) \geq Y(\omega)$ .

If you claim that  $p(X) < p(Y)$  then I would be happy for you to accept the bet that delivers  $(Y - p(Y)) - (X - p(X)) = -(X - Y) - (p(Y) - p(X))$ , which is always  $< 0$ .  $\square$

## Note

*If both  $X$  and  $X - p(X)$  are fair, so is  $X - (X - p(X))$  with constant return. This implies that  $p(X) = 0$ .*

# de Finetti Theorem

## Theorem

$p(F_X \cup F_Y) = p(F_X) + p(F_Y)$  for disjoint  $F_X, F_Y \subseteq \Omega$ . Here we have used the de Finetti notation  $p(A) = p(\mathbf{1}_A)$  for  $A \subseteq \Omega$ .



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## Proof.

As a special case, consider the bet that returns 1 if an event  $F$  occurs, and 0 otherwise. The previous theorem implies

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We can similarly show that  $p(\Omega) = 1$  and  $p(\emptyset) = 0$ .

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- The bet that returns  $(X - p(X|F))F$  is fair.
- The indicator function  $F$  ensures that money changes hands only when  $F$  occurs.

## Theorem

If  $\Omega$  is partitioned into disjoint events  $F_1, \dots, F_k$ . and  $X$  is a random variable, then  $p(X) = \sum_{i=1}^k p(F_i) p(X|F_i)$ .

## Proof.

For a single  $F_i$ , argue by linearity that

$$0 = p(XF_i - p(X|F_i)F_i) = p(XF_i) - p(X|F_i) p(F_i).$$

Sum over  $i$ , using linearity again, together with the fact that  $X = \sum_i XF_i$ , to deduce that  $p(X) = \sum_i p(XF_i) = \sum_i p(F_i)p(X|F_i)$ , as asserted.  $\square$

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$$1 = p(1) = p\left(\sum_{0 \leq t \leq 1} X_t\right) \stackrel{?}{=} \sum_{0 \leq t \leq 1} p(X_t) = \begin{cases} 0 & c = 0 \\ \infty & \text{else} \end{cases}$$