

ESE532: System-on-a-Chip Architecture

Day 25: April 19, 2017
Fault Tolerance



Today

- Fault Sources
- Fault Tolerance
 - Memories
 - Interconnect
 - Compute

Message

- At small feature sizes, voltages, and high speed, not viable or economical to demand perfect operation across billions and trillions of operations
- Little redundancy can go a long way
- For large systems, reliability must be engineered
 - ...all systems are becoming large

Reminder

Simple Implications: $P_{\text{good}} = P_g^N$

- As N gets large
 - must either increase reliability
 - ...or start tolerating failures
- N
 - memory bits
 - disk sectors
 - wires
 - transmitted data bits
 - processors
 - transistors
 - molecules

As devices get **smaller**, failure rates increase
chemists think $P=0.95$ is good

As devices get **faster**, failure rate increases

Three Problems

1. **Defects:** Manufacturing imperfection
 - Occur before operation; persistent
 - Shorts, breaks, bad contact
2. **Transient Faults:**
 - Occur during operation; transient
 - node X value flips: crosstalk, ionizing particles, bad timing, tunneling, thermal noise
3. **Lifetime “wear” defects**
 - Parts become bad during operational lifetime
 - Fatigue, electromigration, burnout....
 - ...slower
 - NBTI, Hot Carrier Injection

Faults


- Bits, processors, wires
 - May fail during operation
- Basic Idea same:
 - Detect failure using redundancy
 - Correct
- Now
 - Must identify and correct **online** with the computation

Fault Sources


Transient Sources

- Effects
 - Thermal noise
 - Supply voltage noise
 - Timing
 - Ionizing particles
 - α particle 10^5 to 10^6 electrons
 - Discharge DRAM cell (multiple)
 - Gates with 15–30 electrons
 - Even if CMOS restores, takes time


Voltage and Error Rate



Scaling and Error Rates



Errors versus Frequency




Memory

Simple Memory Example


- **Problem:** bits may lose/change value
 - Alpha particle
 - Molecule spontaneously switches
- **Idea:**
 - Store multiple copies
 - Perform majority vote on result

Redundant Memory




Redundant Memory

- Like M-choose-N
- Only fail if $>(N-1)/2$ faults
- $P=0.9$
- Preclass: $P(2 \text{ of } 3)?$




Redundant Memory

- Like M-choose-N
- Only fail if $>(N-1)/2$ faults
- $P=0.9$
- $P(2 \text{ of } 3)$
 - All good: $(0.9)^3 = 0.729$
 - + Any 2 good: $3(0.9)^2(0.1)=0.243$
 - $= 0.971$**



Redundant Memory

- Unsatisfying
 - Costs 3x (5x, 7x...) area
 - ...and energy
- How can we do better?
 - Less overhead?



Better: Less Overhead


- Don't have to keep N copies
- Block data into groups
- Add a small number of bits to detect/correct errors

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Row/Column Parity


- Think of NxN bit block as array
- Compute row and column parities
– (total of 2N bits)



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Row/Column Parity


- Think of NxN bit block as array
- Compute row and column parities
– (total of 2N bits)
- Any single bit error



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Row/Column Parity

- Think of NxN bit block as array
- Compute row and column parities
– (total of 2N bits)
- Any single bit error
- By recomputing parity
– Know which one it is
– Can correct it



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Preclass Exercise


- Which Block has an error?
- What correction do we need?

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Row/Column Parity

- Simple case is 50% overhead
– Add 8 bits to 16
– Better than 200% with 3 copies
– Overhead drop with block size
• How scale?
– More expensive than used in practice



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In Use Today

- Conventional DRAM Memory systems
 - Use 72b ECC (Error Correcting Code)
 - On 64b words [12.5% overhead]
 - Correct any single bit error
 - Detect multibit errors
- CD and flash blocks are ECC coded
 - Correct errors in storage/reading
- Learn More: ESE 676

Data Storage

CETS ENIAC Cluster

- Holds your home directory
- ...and faculty and research data
- Stored on cluster of hard drives
 - Crude guess ~ 1000

Preclass 4

- Assume 300,000 hour MTBF/disk
- Expected number of disk failures/year for cluster of 1000?

RAID

- Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks
- Disk drives have ECC on sectors
 - At least enough to detect failure
- RAID-5 has one parity disk
 - Tolerate any single disk failure
 - Parity enough to reconstruct when know which disk failed (technical term: Erasure code)
 - E.g. 8-of-9 survivability case
 - With *hot spare*, can rebuild data on spare

Interconnect

Gigabit Ethernet

- 1000BASE-T
- CAT-5 cables
- Specifies: Bit Error Rate (BER) $<10^{-10}$
- TCP/IP Packet ~ 1500Bytes
 - Call is 1250 to make math easy
- Probability of packet corruption?
- After takes 10 network hops?
- Errors in 2 hour movie?

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Interconnect

- Also uses checksums/ECC
 - Guard against data transmission errors
 - Environmental noise, crosstalk, trouble sampling data at high rates...
- Often just detect error
- Recover by requesting retransmission
 - E.g. TCP/IP (Internet Protocols)

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Interconnect


- Also guards against whole path failure
- Sender expects acknowledgement
- If no acknowledgement will retransmit
- If have multiple paths
 - ...and select well among them
 - Can route around any fault in interconnect

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Interconnect Fault Example


- Send message
- Expect Acknowledgement



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Interconnect Fault Example


- Send message
- Expect Acknowledgement
- If Fail



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Interconnect Fault Example


- Send message
- Expect Acknowledgement
- If Fail
 - No ack



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Interconnect Fault Example

- If Fail → no ack
 - Retry
 - Preferably with different resource




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Interconnect Fault Example

- If Fail → no ack
 - Retry
 - Preferably with different resource



Ack signals success

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
Compute

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Compute Elements

- Simplest thing we can do:
 - Compute redundantly
 - Vote on answer
 - Similar to redundant memory



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Compute Elements

- Unlike Memory
 - State of computation important
 - Once a processor makes an error
 - All subsequent results may be wrong
- Response
 - “reset” processors which fail vote
 - Go to spare set to replace failing processor

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In Use

- NASA Space Shuttle
 - Uses set of 4 voting processors
- Boeing 777
 - Uses voting processors
 - Uses different architectures for processors
 - Uses different software
 - Avoid Common-Mode failures
 - Design errors in hardware, software

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Forward Recovery


- Can take this voting idea to gate level
 - VonNeuman 1956
- Basic gate is a majority gate
 - Example 3-input voter
- Alternate stages
 - Compute
 - Voting (restoration)
- Number of technical details...
- High level bit:
 - Requires $P_{gate} > 0.996$
 - Can make whole system as reliable as individual gate

Detect / Correct

Correction

- Forward error correction with voting unsatisfying
- Paying 3x (5x, 7x, ...)

 - Area
 - Energy



Detect vs. Correct

Detection is cheaper than correction


1. Redundancy: To handle k-faults

- Voting correction requires $2k+1$
 - $K=1 \rightarrow 3$
- Detection requires $k+1$
 - $K=1 \rightarrow 2$


2. Computation

- E.g.: Sorting ($N \cdot \log(N)$) vs. check in sorted order (N)

2D Window Filtering



- Compute output image as weighted sum of pixels
 - Demosaic
 - Gaussian filter
- Weight of subregion proportional to weight of original
 - Except edging effects




$$\frac{\text{Check}}{\text{Compute}} = \frac{2C_{add}}{W_{coeff}(C_{add} + C_{mpy})}$$

E.g. 3x3 window with no zeros
 $C_{mpy}/C_{add}=10$
 $\text{Check}/\text{Compute} = 2/99 \approx 2\%$

Rollback Recovery

- Commit state of computation at key points
 - to memory (ECC, RAID protected...)
 - ...reduce to previously solved problem of protecting memory
- On faults (lifetime defects)
 - recover state from last checkpoint
 - like going to last backup....
 - ... (snapshot)

Rollback vs. Forward



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Networking, Data Center

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Cloud Providers

- How does Google deal with millions of simultaneous user search requests?
- What effect of one computer crashing in their cloud?

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Google (2008)

- Building block 1800 server cluster
- *In each cluster's first year, it's typical that*
 - 1,000 individual machine failures will occur;
 - thousands of hard drive failures will occur;
 - ... and there's about a 50 percent chance that the cluster will overheat, taking down most of the servers in less than 5 minutes and taking 1 to 2 days to recover.

<http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2008/05/30/failure-rates-in-google-data-centers/>

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Defect vs. Fault Tolerance

- Defect
 - Can tolerate large defect rates (10%)
 - Use virtually all good components
 - Small overhead beyond faulty components
- Fault
 - Require lower fault rate (e.g. VN < 0.4%)
 - Overhead to do so can be quite large

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Summary

- Possible to engineer practical, reliable systems from
 - Imperfect fabrication processes (defects)
 - Unreliable elements (faults)
- We do it today for large scale systems
 - Memories (DRAMs, Hard Disks, CDs)
 - Internet
 - Multiprocessor chips
 - Data Centers
- ...and critical systems
 - Space ships, Airplanes
- Engineering Questions
 - Where invest area/effort?
 - Higher yielding components? Tolerating faulty components?

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Big Ideas

- Left to itself:
 - reliability of system \ll reliability of parts
- Can design
 - system reliability \gg reliability of parts [defects]
 - system reliability \sim reliability of parts [faults]
- For large systems
 - must engineer reliability of system
 - ...all systems becoming “large”

Admin

- Final Project Report
 - Due Friday
- Collect Zed Boards
 - Class Monday 4/24