Secure Cyber-Physical Systems
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Project Overview:

Medical Cyber Physical Systems
New control system security vulnerabilities arise when malicious attackers exploit the physical environment -- not protected by cybersecurity defenses -- to execute an attack (e.g. GPS spoofing). Ensuring the safety and performance of cyber physical control systems requires algorithms capable of closing-the-loop despite malicious disturbances while simultaneously operating within the implementation resource constraints. Although small disturbance attenuation is a centerpiece of all robust control systems, stability and safety claims become invalid when model and measurement deviations violate the design assumptions. In this theme, my research aims to design secure cyber physical control systems within the application resource constraints and analyze the corresponding robustness against malicious attacks.
Project Links:

University of Pennsylvania:
University of California Los Angeles (UCLA): Duke University:


Attack-Resilient Velocity Estimation on a Real Vehicle
Attack-resilient state estimation implmented in a car. We illustrate performance of attack-resilient state estimation when GPS and/or encoder measurements are attacked on a real-vehicle.

Attack-resilient Cruise Control on the LansShark
Experiments on the Black-I LandShark robot. We illustrate the use of attack-resilient state estimation when used for Cruise Control on different surfaces/terrains. During the experiments we activate/deactivate the resilient state estimators, run different attacks on different sensors, save data, change the gains of the PID loop, and trim the vehicles. Trimming was necessary on the LandShark because the two sides of the vehicles are unbalanced and we are not controlling the steering of the vehicle.